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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for special and general damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, Robby 
Mowrey ("Robby") and Kim Mowrey ("Kim"), husband and wife (referred to jointly as the 
"Mowreys"), for personal injuries sustained by Robby on June 29, 2005, in the course of his 
employment as a truck driver for Bowen Petroleum Company, at a Pocatello bulk petroleum 
facility owned by the Defendants, Chevron Pipe Line Company ("Chevron") and Northwest 
Terminalling Company ("Northwest"). The injuries suffered by Robby resulted in both lower 
back and neck surgery and 100% disability and loss of employment. The Mowreys claim that the 
personal injuries suffered by Robby were the direct and proximate result of the improper, 
negligent and careless and/or intentional and wilful conduct of Chevron and/or Northwest in the 
design and/or failure to properly maintain the swing arm and/or other loading devise that was 
required to be used by drivers in the course of loading petroleum products from the storage tanks 
to the truck tanks at their bulk petroleum facility. 
The personal injuries suffered by Robby are the basis for this cause of action against 
Chevron and Northwest based on negligence and also the basis for a workers' compensation 
claim against his employer under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Following Robby's injury at the Chevron/Northwest Pocatello bulk petroleum facility on 
June 29, 2005, the Mowreys were compelled to file a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
on or about September 8, 2005, based on the loss of income as a result of the above-referenced 
industrial accident. R. pp. 98-99. The petition and schedules filed by the Mowreys becomes the 
critical factor in the course of proceedings resulting in this appeal. 
At the Creditors' Meeting held on October 12, 2005, the Mowreys appeared without 
counsel and were questioned by the Trustee as to the basis for having filed for bankruptcy 
protection, to which Robby responded disclosing the loss of employment and reduction in 
income due to the industrial accident on June 29, 2005. There was no suggestion by the Trustee 
that they amend their schedules to identify the workers' compensation claim as an asset, nor of 
any potential contingent claim for third party liability. R. p. 96, p. 99. 
During or about June 2006, the Mowreys were informed by the Trustee that there would 
be a claim for their tax year 2005 income tax refund and they received a refund of approximately 
$4,000.00 and subsequently received a request by letter to turnover those funds to the Trustee, 
which they did. Subsequently, on May 4, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order 
Approving Trustee's Supplemental Final Report, Discharging Trustee, and Closing the Estate. 
R. pp. 96-97, pp. 99-100. 
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During, or immediately prior to, July, 2006, the Mowreys were advised by the claims 
representative for the Idaho State Insurance Fund to consult with an attorney regarding Robby's 
workers' compensation claim. The Mowreys consulted with Attorney M. Brent Morgan and for 
the first time discovered that in addition to the workers' compensation claim, which was already 
open, there may be a potential third-party claim against one or both of the Defendants in this 
case. The Mowreys did not disclose to said attorney that they had previously filed for a Chapter 
7 bankruptcy or that the case had been reopened at that time for recovery of their income tax 
refund, because they did not know that their bankruptcy had any bearing on this claim. R. pp. 96-
97, p. 100. 
On June 19, 2007, the Mowreys filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
against Chevron and Northwest and other John and Jane Doe defendants R. p. l; and, their 
Amended Complaint on July 26, 2007. R. p. 7. Chevron and Northwest filed an Answer on or 
about August 10, 2007. R. p. 14. No other defendants have been expressly named or served in 
this matter. 
This matter was originally assigned to the Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, 
and then transferred to the Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge, upon the retirement of 
Judge McDermott. 
On January 19, 2011, Chevron and Northwest filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 
p. 29, supported by Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment R. p. 82 and the Affidavit of Kevin C. Braley R. p. 28, then attorney of record for the 
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Defendants, for the first time making reference in these proceedings to the Mowreys' above-
referenced bankruptcy proceedings and asserting as a basis for summary judgment that the 
Mowreys are judicially estopped from bringing claims they failed to disclose in their bankruptcy 
case and that the Mowreys' bankruptcy trustee, and not the Mowreys, is the real party in interest 
to assert the Mowreys' claims. 
As soon as the Mowreys became aware that both the workers' compensation claim and 
potential third-party claim should have been declared as a "contingent and unliquidated claim" in 
their bankruptcy schedules, they immediately retained Attorney Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. to file a 
motion with the Bankruptcy Court to reopen their case pursuant to 11 USC 350(b) in order to 
amend their petition and schedules and permit the Trustee to administer the estate as he deemed 
proper; and, filed a further motion for the appointment of their attorney, M. Brent Morgan, to 
proceed with this action on behalf of the Trustee. R. p. 97, p. 100, pp. 109-110, pp. 121-123. 
The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order to Reopen Case on January 28, 2011, and directed the 
U.S. Trustee to appoint a trustee to assess both the workers' compensation claim and the third-
party claim in this case. R. p. 127. 
On January 31, 2011, a Response & Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed on behalf of the Mowreys and addressing the issues raised by Chevron and 
Northwest in their motion for summary judgment, including reference to the Mowreys' motion to 
reopen their bankruptcy case and the Bankruptcy Court's Order to Reopen, which had already 
been entered. R. p. 101. This response and objection was supported by the affidavits of the 
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Plaintiff, Robby Mowrey, R. p. 98, and of the Plaintiff, Kim Mowrey, R. p. 95, confirming that at 
the time they filed their petition for bankruptcy, they had no knowledge of any potential third-
party claim and that prior to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, they had no 
knowledge that either the worker's compensation claim or third-party claim should have been 
scheduled as a "contingent and unliquidated claim" in their bankruptcy schedules. The facts set 
forth in the affidavits of the Mowreys were undisputed. This response and objection was also 
supported by the affidavit of Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. confirming the motions filed on behalf of the 
Mowreys in the Bankruptcy Comi. R. p. 109. 
On May 3, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court entered an OrderAutlwrizing Retention and 
Continued Employment of Attorney Representing Debtors in Pending Civil Actions for 
Workman's Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages which expressly authorized 
Mowreys' (Debtors') attorney to continue to represent them as special litigation counsel on 
behalf of the trustee to render necessary legal services in their pending civil actions for 
Workman's Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages; and, directed that any 
recovery from either or both civil actions be first applied to payment of the Bankruptcy Estate 
and Trustee's fees before the Mowreys (Debtors) or their attorney are paid. R. p. 157. Reference 
to this Order was made to the District Court at the time of oral arguments on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On July 13, 2011, a Memorandum Decision and Order and Judgment was entered 
granting summary judgment to the Defendants based on the finding of the District Court that the 
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Mowreys did have sufficient knowledge of the factual basis of the undisclosed claims, despite the 
Mowreys' undisputed denial of such knowledge; and, a determination by the District Court that 
the Mowreys were not the real party in interest to prosecute the claims that now belong to the 
bankruptcy trustee, making no reference to the above-referenced May 3, 2011, Order 
Authorizing Retention and Continued Employment of Attorney Representing Debtors in 
Pending Civil Actions for Workman's Compensation Benefits and Personal Injwy Damages 
which has been entered by the Bankruptcy Court. R. p. 139. 
On July 25, 2011, the Mowreys filed a Motion to Reconsider & to Alter or Amend 
Memorandum Decision, Order & Judgment, supported by the additional affidavits of Laurie 
Crawford, R. p. 161, and J. Jay Meyers R. p. 178, relative to the pending Workers' Compensation 
Complaint of the Plaintiff, Robby Mowrey, and the resulting subrogation claim of the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund (ISIF) and potential subrogation claim of the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund 
against the Defendants. Although not referenced in this Record, the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
also filed a Motion for Intervention and Substitution of Real Party in Interest seeking to 
intervene and for substitution as the real patiy in interest based on its subrogation claim. The 
motion of ISIF was denied. 
The Defendants filed their Response on August 30, 2011, R. p. 198, and the District 
Court then entered its 1l1emorandum Decision and Order on September 29, 2011, denying the 
Mowreys' motion to reconsider and the motion for intervention and substitution of the Idaho 
State Insurance Fund based on essentially the same findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
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relied upon in its original memorandum decision and order. R. p. 222. 
The Mowreys filed their Notice of Appeal on October 24, 2011, R. p. 244, and Amended 
Notice of Appeal on December 7, 2011. R. p. 254. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE RE LEV ANT FACTS 
The underlying facts which are the basis for the Mowreys' negligence claim against 
Chevron and Northwest are not relevant to the issues that are before this Court on appeal i.e. the 
facts which are relevant are those dealing with the filing by the Mowreys of a petition for 
bankruptcy and the issues provided in their supporting schedules and the facts relied upon by the 
District Court as a basis for its finding as to the real party in interest. 
Those facts were provided by the affidavits filed on behalf of Chevron and No1ihwest in 
support of their motion for summary judgment and those affidavits filed on behalf of the 
Mowreys in response and objection to that motion for summary judgment and in support of their 
motion to reconsider, which are as follows: 
1. Robby Mowrey was injured as a result of an industrial accident that occurred on June 
25, 2009. Robby timely filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, Bowen 
Petroleum Company. . R. pp. 98-99. 
2. The Mowreys were compelled to file a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on 
or about September 8, 2005, based on the loss of income as a result of the above-referenced 
industrial accident. R. pp. 98-99. 
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3. The petition and schedules filed by the Mowreys were prepared by Attorney Thomas 
F. Hale, who has since been disbarred from practicing law before the United States District and 
Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Idaho and is prohibited from representing any clients in 
cases and matters before those Courts. R. p. 110. 
4. The Mowreys never met with Mr. Hale, nor did their receive any advise or counsel of 
any type regarding their petition or schedules from Mr. Hale. R. pp. 98-99. 
5. The original bankruptcy petition and supporting schedules filed on behalf of the 
Mowreys did not reference either the workers' compensation claim of Robby Mowrey or any 
potential claim against Chevron or Northwest. At the same time, the original petition and 
support schedules did not seek to discharge any debt owed to Chevron or Northwest, nor were 
they listed as creditors; and, the original petition and supporting schedules did not seek to 
discharge any subrogation claim possessed by the Idaho State Insurance Fund or the Idaho 
Special Indemnity Fund, nor was either of them listed as a creditor. 
6. Both Robby and Kim confirmed that their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed 
because of a loss of income and inability to pay their unsecured creditors, not because of an 
intent to escape liability for medical expenses incurred as a result of Robby's injuries or the 
subrogation claims of either the Idaho State Insurance Fund or the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund; 
that the industrial accident and pending workers' compensation claim was disclosed to the trustee 
at the time of the creditors' meeting; and, that at no time prior to the filing of the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment did they receive counsel or advise suggesting that either the 
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workers' compensation claim or third-party claim against these Defendants constituted a 
"contingent and unliquidated claim" which should have been listed in their bankruptcy petition 
and supporting schedules. R. pp. 95-97, pp. 98-100. The fact that they declared under penalty 
of perjury that their petition and schedules were "true and correct to the best of our knowledge, 
information and belief' was accurate at the time that the petition and schedules were filed and 
continuing throughout the pendency of their bankruptcy proceeding. R. p. 96, p. 99. 
7. The first reference to judicial estoppel based on the Mowreys' petition in bankruptcy 
or to the Mowreys not being the real party in interest based on that petition in bankruptcy was in 
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. R. p. 82. 
8. Upon notification of their failure to properly identify a "contingent and unliquidated 
claim"in their original petition for bankruptcy, the Mowreys immediately responded with the 
filing of a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to reopen their case pursuant to 11 USC 350(b) in 
order to amend their petition and schedules and permit the Trustee to administer the estate as he 
deemed proper; and, filed a further motion for the appointment of their attorney, M. Brent 
Morgan, to proceed with this action on behalf of the Trustee. An amended schedule disclosing 
both the workers' compensation claim and third-party claim was filed. R. p. 109. 
9. The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order to Reopen Case on January 28, 2011, and 
directed the U.S. Trustee to appoint a trustee to assess both the workers' compensation claim and 
the third-party claim in this case. R. p. 101. 
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10. On May 3, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Authorizing Retention and 
Continued Employment of Attorney Representing Debtors in Pending Civil Actions for 
Workman's Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages which expressly authorized 
Mowreys' (Debtors') attorney to continue to represent them as special litigation counsel on 
behalf of the trustee to render necessary legal services in their pending civil actions for 
Workman's Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages; and, directed that any 
recovery from either or both civil actions be first applied to payment of the Bankruptcy Estate 
and Trustee's fees before the Mowreys (Debtors) or their attorney are paid. R. p. 139. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellants submit the following issues to be considered on appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court ened in misapplying the principles and law governing 
summary judgment in this case? 
2. Whether the District Court's ened in misapplying the principles oflaw governing 
judicial estoppel in this case and whether dismissal of the Mowreys' claim based on the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel is an abuse of discretion and an act of inequity in the name of equity? 
3. Whether the District Court ened in dismissing the Mowreys' claim on the basis that 
the Trustee was the "real party in interest", where the Order entered in the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court pre-empted that issue by authorizing Mowreys' counsel to continue to represent the 
Mowreys (Debtors) in both the workman's compensation case and this personal injury action as 
"special litigation counsel on behalf of the Trustee" and the Trustee authorized the Mowreys to 
proceed on behalf of the bankruptcy estate in accordance with that Order? 
4. Whether the Mowreys are entitled to attorneys fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
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ARGUMENT 
A. MISAPPLICATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
1. The Summary Judgment Standard. 
The Defendants in this case filed for summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part: 
" ... the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposition and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... 
Such judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered for or against any party to the action. 
II 
The unique aspect of this particular motion for summary judgment is that the Defendants 
did not file based the failure or inability of the Mowreys to establish a basis for negligence or 
damages, but rather on the affirmative defenses of ( 1) the Mowreys being precluded from 
bringing their claim based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel resulting from the failure to 
disclose their claim against the Defendants in their bankruptcy case; and/or (2) the Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy Trustee is the real party in interest to bring those claims. 
Nevertheless, the basic principles of law on summary judgment still apply i.e. upon a 
motion for summary judgment, both the district court and the Supreme Court upon review, must 
liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960 (1994); citing Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 867 
(1991). All reasonable inferences that can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the 
party opposing the motion. Id The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all 
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times upon the moving party. Tingley v. Harrison, supra., citing G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Company, 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
The following additional principles of law apply in this case i.e. affirmative defenses are 
governed by the basic principles of Rule 8( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) which 
provides that: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory or comparative 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by felow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. (Emphasis added.) 
It is noted that the assertion that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is not 
expressly listed as an affirmative defense in Rule 8( c ), but the Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently held that Rule 8( c) recognizes that there may exist other affirmative defenses not 
specifically mentioned by including on the list "any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense." Fuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho800, 153 P.3d 480 (2007). 
The Court in Fuhriman went on to define an affirmative defense as "[a] defendant's 
assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's 
claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true." Black's Law Dictionary 186 (2d Pocket 
ed. 2001 ). Id. 
Mowreys are not asserting that Defendants were precluded from pursuing either of these 
affirmative defenses by not having pled them in their answer, since the Court in Fuhriman also 
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noted that an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time on a motion for summary 
judgment. Id. However, what is emphasized is that the defendant pleading an affirmative 
defense has the burden of proving every element necessary to establish that affirmative defense. 
Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 504, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990). The burden of proving these 
affirmatives defenses was on Chevron and Northwest i.e. it was not the burden of the Mowreys 
to prove these defenses did not apply. 
2. Misapplication of the Summary Judgment Standard. 
The Mowreys respectfully submit that the District Court in this case misapplied the 
summary judgment standard as it weighed the evidence against the Mowreys by not giving them 
the inferences in the record and by having ignored their affidavits that they did not intentionally 
conceal any assets from the Bankruptcy Court. It is well-established that on summary judgment, 
a trial court is not allowed to weigh the evidence: 
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must determine if 
there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of facts. On such a motion it 
is not the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those issues. 
Moreover, all doubts must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. 
Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960) 
[Emphasis added]. See also, American Land Title Co v Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 
1063, 1064 (1983) ("A trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh 
evidence or resolve controverted factual issues."); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 
724, 730, 552 P.2d 776, 782 (1976)(citing, Merrill, supra); Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 
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993P.2d 609, 612 (2000). 
A trier of fact may not arbitrarily disregard credible and unimpeached testimony of a witness. 
Woodv. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703, 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1998), citing Dinneen v. Finch, 100 
Idaho 620, 627-28, 603 P.2d 575, 582-83 (1979). In a related vein, it has long been recognized 
that unless a witness's testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and 
circumstances disclosed at trial, the trier of fact must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimony of a credible witness. Wood v. Hoglund, citing Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, et al., 
58 Idaho 438, 447, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937). 
In this case, the factual evidence set forth in the affidavits filed on behalf of the Mowreys 
was not contradicted or disputed. Likewise, missing from the record is a finding by the District 
Court that the affidavit testimony was not credible. Reference to the affidavits filed by the 
Plaintiff Robby Mowrey and by the Plaintiff Kim Mowrey clearly and unequivocally confirm that 
they did not intentionally fail to disclose either Robby's workers compensation claim against his 
employer, or the potential third-party negligence claim of both Mowreys as a result of that same 
industrial accident. Both Robby and Kim believed that their petition and schedules in the 
bankruptcy action had been reviewed and approved by attorney Thomas Hale and contained 
reference to all of their assets. 
The failure to disclose the two potential claims was a good faith mistake and the District 
Court should not have presumed the facts as a basis for application of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel in this case that such failure by the Mowreys was done with the intent to deceive either 
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the Bankruptcy Court or their creditors. The District Court misapplied the summary judgment 
standard and, as a result, its decision granting summary judgment to the Defendants should be 
reversed and the Mowreys allowed to pursue their claim against the Defendants. 
B. THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE MET IN THIS CASE 
The Mowreys assert the following points and authorities on the issue of the proper 
application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel: 
1. The District Court's Dismissal ofMowreys' Claim is an Abuse of 
Discretion and an Act of Inequity in the name of Equity. 
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked at the discretion of the court. Sword 
v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004); Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 
116, 121-2, 138 P.3d316, 321-1 (2006). TheNinthCircuitBankruptcyComiof Appeals 
elaborated on this equitable doctrine: 
Judicial estoppel 'is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion. 'Equitable' 
in this context refers more to fairness and discretion than to the technical distinction 
between law and equity. It follows that the fashioning of a remedy to implement a 
judicial estoppel must be grounded on notions of fairness and preventing injustice. 
Preventing injustice and furthering notions of fairness are entrenched equitable 
principles that need to be taken into account whenever fashioning a remedy in the 
nature of estoppel. It is a maxim of equity that a court of equity seeks to do justice and 
not injustice. It will not do 'inequity in the name of equity.' 
An-Tze v. K&S Diversified Investments, Inc., 308 B.R. 448,459 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2004) 
[Emphasis added.] 
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The District Court's dismissal of the Mowreys' claim in this case was an act of "inequity 
in the name of equity." The District Court abused its discretion, as there was no evidence in the 
record that the Mowreys' conduct was anything other than a good faith omission or an 
inadvertent oversight, and not an intentional act or scheme to mislead the Bankruptcy Court. 
"Judicial estoppel does not apply when a debtor's 'prior position was taken because of a 
good-faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court." Stallings v. Bussmann 
Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049 (81h Cir. 2006). Moreover, 
A rule that the 'requisite intent for judicial estoppel can be inferred from the mere fact of 
nondisclosure in a bankruptcy proceeding [would] unduly expand the reach of judicial 
estoppel in post-bankruptcy proceedings and would inevitably result in the preclusion of 
viable claims on the basis of inadve1ient or good-faith inconsistencies. Careless or 
inadvertent disclosures are not the equivalent of deliberate manipulation. Courts 
should only apply the doctrine as an extraordinary remedy when a party's inconsistent 
behavior will result in a miscarriage of justice. 
Stallings, supra, citing Ryan v. Operations G.P. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 
355, 362 (3rd Cir. 1996) [Emphasis added]. Further, judicial estoppel is 
[N]ot meant to be a technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially meritorious 
claims, especially when the alleged inconsistency is insignificant at best and there is no 
evidence of intent to manipulate or mislead the courts. Judicial estoppel is not a sword to 
be wielded by adversaries unless such tactics are necessary to secure substantial equity. 
Ryan, supra, 81 F.3d at 364 [Emphasis added]. 
The lack of any evidence that the Mowreys intentionally did not list either the workman's 
compensation or the third-party claim against Chevron and/or Northwest in their bankruptcy 
precludes barring their claim, as it would dismiss a meritorious claim. Dismissal of the Mowreys 
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claim in this case allows Chevron and Northwest to escape liability for their negligent conduct, 
creating an "inequity in the name of equity." 
2. Judicial Estoppel does not apply, because the Plaintiffs' claim against 
these Defendants had nothing to do with their bankruptcy, did not involve the same 
parties and did not arise out of the same transaction. 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants in this case had nothing to 
do with their bankruptcy, as the Plaintiffs did not seek to discharge any debt owed to these 
Defendants, nor were the Defendants listed as creditors in the Plaintiffs' bankruptcy. In other 
words, the parties were not the same, and the claims did not arise out of the same transaction. 
Indeed, it would be a different scenario if the Plaintiffs had been indebted to the Defendants in 
this case and sought relief from such debt in the bankruptcy. That is not the case that is before 
this Court and that fact is not disputed. 
The Defendants relied entirely on A & J Constr. Co. Inc., v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 
P.3d 12 (2005) and the District Court accepted those arguments. That case is distinguishable for 
several reasons. First, pursuant to Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94,277 P.2d 561, 565 
(1954), cited to by the Idaho Supreme Court in A & J Constr., judicial estoppel applies where the 
alleged inconsistent statements "aris[e] out of the same transaction or subject matter." The Court 
in Loomis also held that judicial estoppel applies only where a litigant, through sworn statements: 
[O]btains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, 
by repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or 
testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of 
the same transaction or subject matter. 
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Loomis, supra, 76 Idaho at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565. 
This premise was followed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Indian Springs LLC v. Indian 
Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457 (2009), where the Court did not apply 
judicial estoppel. In that case, the Court held that "the party asserting judicial estoppel must show 
that the sworn statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration 
from another party." Id., (citing, Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565). 
The well-settled maxim set forth in Loomis prevents the application of judicial estoppel 
against the Mowreys in this case i.e. the Mowreys' bankruptcy and their third-party claims 
against Chevron and Northwest did not arise out of the same transaction. The Mowreys filed for 
bankruptcy simply because they got behind in their credit card payments. They did not file for 
bankruptcy due to their claim against Chevron and/or Northwest. In contrast, in A &J Constr., 
the debtor in that case filed bankruptcy regarding a property purchase, and later sued a company 
with whom the debtor had purchased the property that he failed to list in the bankruptcy. Id., 141 
Idaho at 683-84, 116 P.3d at 13-14. The debtor sought profits from the sale of that property. Id. 
Thus, both cases arose out of the same transaction and involved the same parties. That is not the 
situation here. 
Also, it is apparent from the facts of A & J Constr. that the debtor intentionally chose not 
to disclose the property as an asset in the bankruptcy, seeking profits from the sale of the 
property, which was the subject of the dispute in the subsequent litigation. Id., 141 Idaho at 
683-84, 116 P .3d at 13-14. Further, the debtor in A&J Constr. certainly sought to gain an 
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advantage against the party by not listing the property as an asset. Id. There is no such nexus 
between the Mowreys' need to file bankruptcy and their claim against Chevron and Northwest. 
The two are unrelated and do not arise out of the same transaction. It would be different if the 
Mowreys had filed for bankruptcy for relief from medical expenses incurred in the industrial 
accident and then later sought a lawsuit against Chevron and Northwest based on those same 
expenses i.e. if they had sought to discharge the debt for medical expenses and then recover 
damages based on those expenses. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not do that in this case. 
Further, it is emphasized that all of the cases which the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon 
in A & J Constr. were cases involving intentional decisions by the debtor not to include the claim 
as an asset or involved the same parties. In Hamilton v. State Farm, 270 F.3d 778 (91h Cir. 2001), 
the debtor, an insured of State Farm, filed a claim for vandalism and property damage, the basis 
for which State Fam1 knew was specious. State Farm denied the claim, just days prior to the 
debtor filing for bankruptcy. In the schedules, the debtor listed a large vandalism loss, and when 
asked by the trustee about it, refused to provide information. Id., at 781. There is no question 
that the debtor there deliberately concealed the suit against State Farm. Hamilton also relied 
upon Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992), where the 
debtor pursued a claim against First Interstate, one of the debtor's major creditors in the 
bankruptcy. Hamilton further relied on In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 202 (51h Cir. 1999). 
The debtor there, one week after filing bankruptcy, filed an adversary proceeding against its 
largest unsecured creditor, and did not disclose a $10,000,000.00 claim against that creditor. Id. 
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Hamilton went on to cite to Oneida Afotor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 
414, 415-16 (3rd Cir. 1988), a case in which the debtor filed a separate lawsuit against one of its 
creditors in the bankruptcy, asserting breach of the loan agreements that gave rise to the debt at 
issue in the bankruptcy. 
It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit requires a finding that a debtor deliberately 
concealed the possible suit. Valdez v. JDR LLC, 2006•LEXIS 51296 at p 2 (July 20, 2006)(citing, 
Johnson v. Oregon Dep't of Human Res. Rehab., 141F.3d1361, 1369 (1998). ("If incompatible 
positions are based not on chicanery, but only on inadvertence or mistake, judicial estoppel does 
not apply"). Further, the doctrine should be applied with caution due to the harsh results 
attendant with precluding a party from asserting a position that would be available. Id., at p. 3. 
Chevron and Northwest did not put forth any evidence in the record that the Mowreys 
intentionally did not disclose either the workman's compensation claim or the third-party 
negligence action against Chevron and/or Northwest. Again, the Mowreys' bankruptcy did not 
pertain to any debt owed to Chevron and/or Northwest, nor was Chevron and/or Northwest a 
creditor in the Mowreys' bankruptcy. Nor did the Mowreys, like the fraudulent insured in 
Hamilton, or the intentional debtor in A & J Constr., try to conceal their claim to gain an 
advantage against Chevron and/or Northwest in this case. 
3. The Defendants in this case are not prejudiced. 
In New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court set forth 
factors to consider in applying judicial estoppel, one of which is whether the party seeking to 
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assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on 
the opposing party if not estopped. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-751. The Idaho Supreme 
Court in A & J Constr. noted that the factors identified in New Hampshire were not required 
elements, but did not preclude the application of the prejudice factor. In this case, the issue of 
the lack of prejudice to Chevron and/ or Northwest is extremely pertinent. Here, neither Chevron, 
nor Northwest will suffer any unfair detriment, nor will the Mowreys obtain an unfair advantage 
against either Chevron or Northwest ifthe Mowreys are not estopped. Again, neither Chevron, 
nor Northwest had a claim in the Mowreys' bankruptcy, and the Mowreys did not seek to 
discharge any debts owed to either Chevron or Northwest. Neither Chevron, nor Northwest will 
suffer any prejudice. In fact, granting them judicial estoppel relief is tantamount to them wielding 
a sword to obtain inequity in the name of equity. If there is a prejudice, it is a prejudice against 
both the creditors in the Mowreys' bankruptcy and the State Insurance Fund, which has a 
subrogation claim against any recovery the Mowreys may obtain against Chevron and/or 
Northwest. 
4. Dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claim prevents them from obtaining a 
judgment against the Defendants, which also prevents the Plaintiffs' creditors from 
recovering from the Plaintiffs. 
It must be remembered that judicial estoppel is an extreme remedy, to be used cautiously 
and in the most extreme situations, to protect the judicial process. In this case, it is emphasized 
that it is the integrity of the Bankruptcy Court which is at issue; and, that is no longer an issue, 
since the Bankruptcy Court granted the Mowreys' motion to amend their schedules. This makes 
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sense, as it protects the Mowreys' creditors. Dismissal of the Mowreys' action against Chevron 
and Northwest hurts and hinders the Mowreys' creditors, which is obvious. If the Mowreys 
action against Chevron and Northwest is dismissed, the potential award they could have received 
from Chevron and/or Northwest to increase their bankruptcy estate and pay their unsecured 
creditors is gone. Gone too is the recovery to the State Insurance Fund as a subrogation claimant. 
This results in inequity in the name of equity, as it deprives these creditors from being repaid. 
Moreover, it is further an inequity in that the only parties who benefit from this dismissal are 
Chevron and N01ihwest, neither of whom were and/or are now parties to the Mowreys' 
bankruptcy. 
5. The Plaintiffs cured the alleged defect by amending their schedules in 
their bankruptcy. 
It is emphasized that A & J Constr. is distinguishable from the Plaintiffs situation in this 
case in that the debtor in A & J Constr. failed to cure the deficiency by reopening the bankruptcy 
to amend his schedules. This Court does not have that factual scenario in this case. Here, the 
Mowreys' filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to reopen their bankruptcy and amend their 
schedules to list both the workman's compensation claim and this lawsuit as an asset in their 
bankruptcy. Further, that motion was granted. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court in A& J Constr., did not consider the issue of whether 
judicial estoppel would bar a plaintiffs state court claim where the plaintiff amended his petition 
to include the lawsuit as an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Georgia Appellate Courts 
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have addressed this issue. Those courts held that once the plaintiff filed an amended petition, the 
judicial estoppel defense was eliminated. This Court should follow those decisions and strike the 
Defendants' judicial estoppel defense against the Plaintiffs. 
The Georgia Appellate Courts held that judicial estoppel does not apply where a plaintiff 
in a state court proceeding, who initially failed to list the litigation as an asset in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, seeks to amend his bankruptcy schedules to include the litigation as an asset. CSX 
Transp. Inc. v. Howell, 675 S.E. 2d 306, 309-10 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); McBride v. Brown, 538 
S.E.2 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). The act of amending the bankruptcy schedules, to add a cause of 
action as an asset, nullifies the original position taken in the bankruptcy, such that the initial 
failure to list the claim as an asset cannot serve as a basis to assert a judicial estoppel defense. 
Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 478 S.F,. 2d 629, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). Further, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals reasoned, "[w]e have since reiterated that amending the bankruptcy petition to 
include the claim, even after the bankruptcy case was closed, precludes judicial estoppel from 
barring the claim." Jowers v. Arthur, 537 S.E. 2d 200, 201-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) [Emphasis 
added]. Furthermore, 
[W]hile the underlying purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent manipulation of the 
judicial process, it is the bankruptcy court that primarily is being manipulated in this 
instance. The creditors lose the potential to recover where such a claim is not listed. 
Therefore, if the bankruptcy court permits an amendment allowing an omitted tort 
claim, it stands to reason that the Georgia court in which the tort claim is asserted 
should honor the bankruptcy court's actions. To hold otherwise would produce overly 
harsh and inequitable results, for then everyone ... would lose, including the debtor's 
innocent creditors. 
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Jowers, supra, at 202 [Emphasis addellj. 
Moreover, any alleged improper advantage the debtor may have gained by not disclosing 
the asset is eliminated when the debtor reopens the bankruptcy case and relinquishes control over 
the asset and its potential proceeds to a trustee. Rowan v. George Green Oil Co., 572 S.E.2d 
3 3 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). A party can avoid judicial estoppel: 
[S]imply by filing a motion to amend the debtor's bankruptcy petition or a motion 
to reopen the debtor's bankruptcy case to declare the omitted claim or cause of 
action. Indeed 'amending the bankruptcy petition to include the claim, even after 
the bankruptcy case was closed, precludes judicial estoppel from barring the 
claim.' 
Rowan, supra, at p. 339 (citing, Jowers, supra). 
Other courts have declined to impose the extreme sanction of judicial estoppel where the 
plaintiffs/debtors amended their petition to list a lawsuit as an asset. Eubanks v. CBSK Financial 
Group, Inc., 385 F.3d 894 (6'" Cir. 2004); Finney v. The Free Ente1prise System, Inc., 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 33858 (W.D. Kentucky 2011). In Finney, the defendant sought to derail the 
plaintiffs' claim against it, asserting the plaintiff, who had filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, failed 
to list his claim against the defendant as an asset. Finney, supra, at p. 2. After the defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment, asserting judicial estoppel, the plaintiff filed a petition to amend 
his bankruptcy petition to reflect his claim against the defendant. Id. The court in Finney, citing 
to Sixth Circuit precedent, rejected defendant's judicial estoppel defense, reasoning: 
Because Jackson joined this suit as a party more than three months before filing for 
bankruptcy, the court has no trouble concluding that he was aware of the factual basis of 
his claims at the time of his filing. Moreover, Jackson would have had a motive to 
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conceal his claim from the bankruptcy court. See Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 Fed. 
Appx. 420, 426 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It is always in a Chapter 13 petitioner's interest to 
minimize income and assets."). However, the record does not reflect bad faith on 
Jackson's part. Jackson has averred, under oath, that he was unaware that he needed to 
include the claim on his bankruptcy petition. He also acted quickly to amend his 
bankruptcy filings once the problem was brought to his attention. 
* * * * * * * 
Jackson's swift amendment of his bankruptcy petition after the defendants' motion was 
filed tips the scales strongly in his favor. 
Finney, supra, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33858 at 2 [Emphasis added]. 
The court in Finney also rejected the defendant's citation to White v. Wyndham 
Ownership, Inc., 617 F .3d 4 72 ( 61h Cir. 2010), distinguishing its application of judicial estoppel 
from the facts of its case: 
The defendants, citing White, argue that [plaintiffs] amendments were "too little, too 
late." The defendants note that the Sixth Circuit in White did "not consider favorably the 
fact that White updated her initial filings after the motion to dismiss was filed," because 
to do so would "encourage gamesmanship." White, 617F. 3d at 481. White, however, is 
distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, the Sixth Circuit's finding of bad 
faith in White was bolstered by other factors -- such as White's decision to file her 
lawsuit only after her bankruptcy plan was confirmed -- that led to a conclusion that 
White's omission was not due to inadvertence or mistake. See M. at 480--83. Second, 
even when the plaintiff in White amended her bankruptcy filings after the defendants 
filed their motion to dismiss, the amendment still did not reflect the estimated amount 
of her claim or whether White was the plaintiff or defendant in the lawsuit, which 
further indicated White's apparent desire to conceal the claim from the bankruptcy 
court. Id. at 481. The defendants do not argue, nor does the court find, evidence of 
such behavior here. 
Finney, supra, at pp. 2-3 [Emphasis added][Italics in original]. 
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The court went on to reason that "[b ]ecause judicial estoppel, as previously noted, should 
be "applied with caution," Eubanks, 385 3d at 897, the court will decline to apply the doctrine 
here." Id., at p.3. 
Like the court in Finney, this Court should reject the Defendants' judicial estoppel 
defense. Once the issue was brought to the Mowreys attention, even after the Defendants filed 
their judicial estoppel defense, like the plaintiff in Finney, the Plaintiffs immediately amended 
their bankruptcv petition and listed this lawsuit and the amount of its worth. The Mowreys did 
this with the Bankruptcy Court's blessing. 
6. Since it was the Bankruptcy Court's integrity that was at issue, judicial 
estoppel does not apply once it granted the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their 
schedules. 
The Mowreys have successfully amended their bankruptcy schedules to list this cause of 
action against Chevron and Northwest as an asset, which the Bankruptcy Court endorsed. Under 
the reasoning from the previously cited cases, the Mowreys' amendment of their bankruptcy 
schedule to include their claim against Chevron and Northwest, even though their bankruptcy 
case was closed, precludes Chevron and Northwest from asserting a judicial estoppel defense. 
Any alleged inconsistent position that the Mowreys took was nullified when they amended their 
petition and schedules. The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial 
process. This means that the Bankruptcy Court's integrity was at stake, not the integrity of the 
District Court. Since the Bankruptcy Court granted the Mowreys the right to amend their petition 
and schedules, and did not deny them that right, judicial estoppel does not apply in the Mowreys 
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case against Chevron and Northwest. This makes sense, as the bankruptcy courts use judicial 
estoppel sparingly, cautiously, and only in the most extreme cases. An-Tze, supra, 308 B.R. at p. 
459. Further, there is no evidence in the record that the Mowreys intentionally attempted to 
manipulate and deceive either the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court. It is emphasized, 
dismissal of the Mowreys' claim would only allow Chevron and Northwest to escape liability for 
their negligent conduct, creating an "inequity in the name of equity." 
C. ISSUE OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
Chevron and Northwest argued and the District Court concluded that it was compelled to, 
and could, mandate that the Trustee must intervene in this action as the "real party in interest." It 
is emphasized that the Order entered in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has pre-empted that issue by 
authorizing Plaintiffs' (Debtors') counsel to continue to represent the Plaintiffs (Debtors) in both 
the workman's compensation case and this personal injury action as "special litigation counsel on 
behalf of the Trustee." The Order recognizes both claims as assets of the Estate and directs that 
the Estate and Trustee's fees will be paid before the Plaintiffs (Debtors) can benefit. 
Furthermore, the principle oflaw requiring that an action be commenced "in the name of the real 
party in interest" is governed by IRCP Rule 17(a). Rule 17(a) makes it clear that no action 
should be dismissed until after a reasonable amount of time has been allowed to permit the real 
party in interest to either ratify the commencement of the action or to be joined or substituted as 
the real party in interest. If it was mandatory that the Trustee appear in this action, the District 
Court could, and should, have allowed the substitution of the Trustee in place of the Mowreys. 
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B. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
The Mowreys are entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal under Idaho 
Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. LC.§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the 
award of attorneys fees and costs in a civil action where the matter was defended frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation. I.A.R. allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party 
on appeal. The affirmative defenses raised by Chevron and Northwest based on judicial estoppel 
had no legal or factual basis; and, it is clear that the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Court was 
authorized to, and did, direct the Mowreys and their attorney to proceed on behalf of the Trustee. 
For these reasons, the Mowreys are entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
First and foremost, it is again emphasized that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is an 
equitable doctrine. In applying the standard on a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants first assert that the District Court should have construed the facts in this case most 
favorably on behalf of the Mowreys (non-moving party) and should have applied the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel given the facts of this case, which can clearly be distinguished from the facts in 
A & J Constr. and any of the cases considered by the Idaho Supreme Court in that case. In doing 
so, it is emphasized that the elements of judicial estoppel simply were not been met by Chevron 
and Northwest in this case. The failure to disclose the two potential claims was a good faith 
mistake that has now been corrected. This case and the bankruptcy case simply did not arise out 
of the same transaction, nor was Chevron or Northwest listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy. It 
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is not Chevron and/or Northwest that will be prejudiced, it is the creditors and the subrogation 
claimant who will be prejudiced by the dismissal of the Mowreys' claim against Chevron and 
Northwest. In addition, it is emphasized that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has already entered its 
Order authorizing the Mowreys and their attorney to go forward on behalf of the Bankruptcy 
Estate and the Trustee. Clearly, this was not an appropriate case for the dismissal of the 
Mowreys' claim on the basis that they were not the real party in interest. 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the 
District Court dismissing the Mowreys claims against Chevron and Northwest both as to the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel and on the issue of the real party in interest and remand this case so 
that the Mowreys can go forward with their action for damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jt3day of July, 2012. 
M. BRENT MORGAN, CHTD. 
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